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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Ample  evidence  exists  suggesting  that  banks 
ration  credit  with  respect  to  loan  size.’  For  exam- 
ple,  Evans  and Jovanovic  (1989)  find evidence  of loan 
size  rationing  in data  from  the  National  Longitudinal 
Survey  of Young  Men.2  Further,  the  Federal  Reserve 
Board’s  quarterly  Survey  of Terms  of Bank  Lending 
consistently  indicates  that  the  average  interest  rate 
charged  on commercial  loans  (i.e.,  the  rate  per  dollar 
lent)  is inversely  related  to  loan  size.  This  evidence 
suggests  two  questions.  First,  why  might  loan  size 
rationing  occur?  Second,  why  might  loan  size  ration- 
ing have  the  particular  interest  rate  and  loan  size  pat- 
tern  reported  in  the  Survey  of  Terms  of  Bank 
Lending?  Economists  generally  believe  that  higher 
average  interest  rates  are  charged  on  smaller  loans 
because  small  borrowers  are  greater  credit  risks  or 
because  loan  administration  costs  are  being  spread 
over  a smaller  base.  This  paper  presents  a counter- 
example  to  that  belief.  It  shows  that,  even  if credit 
risk  and  loan  administration  costs  are  the  same 
for  all borrowers,  a lender  with  market  power  and 
l  Stacey  Schreft  is an  economist  at  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  Richmond,  and  Anne  Villamil  is an  economics  professor  at 
the  University  of  Illinois  at  Champaign-Urbana.  The  authors 
gratefully  acknowledge  the  financial  support  of  the  University 
of Illinois  and  the  National  Science  Foundation  (SES  89-09242). 
They  wish  to thank  Dan  Bechter,  Kathryn  Combs,  Bill Cullison, 
Michael  Dotsey,  Donald  Hodgman,  Charles  Holt,  David 
Humphrey,  Ayse  Imrohoroglu,  Peter  Ireland,  Jeffrey  Lacker, 
David  Mengle,  Loretta  Mester,  Neil  Wallace,  Roy  Webb  and 
seminar  participants  at the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of Richmond 
for  comments  on  an  earlier  version  of  this  paper.  The  views 
expressed  in  this  paper  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of 
the  Federal  Reserve  Svstem  or  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Richmond. 
’ Jaffee  and  Stiglitz  (1990)  present  alternative  definitions  of 
“credit  rationing.”  Broadly  defined,  credit  rationing  occurs  when 
there  exists  an excess  demand  for loans  because  quoted  interest 
rates  differ  from  those  that  would  equate  the  demand  and 
supply  of  loans. 
* This  evidence  is contrary  to  most  recent  theoretical  models 
of  credit  rationing.  That  literature  derives  loan  quantig  ration- 
ing,  whereby  some  borrowers  obtain  loans  while  other  observa- 
tionally  identical  borrowers  do  not,  in the  spirit  of  Stiglitz  and 
Weiss  (1981).  While  some  quantity  rationing  does  occur,  the 
evidence  suggests  that  size  rationing  is  more  common. 
imperfect  information  about  borrowers’  characteristics 
still will offer  quantity-dependent  loan  interest  rates 
of exactly  the  type  reported  in the  Survey  of Terms 
of  Bank  Lending.3 
The  quantity-dependent  loan  interest  rates  that  we 
derive  are  a form  of second-degree  price  discrimina- 
tion.  Price  discrimination  is said to  occur  in a market 
when  a seller  offers  different  units  of a good  to buyers 
at  different  prices.  This  type  of  pricing  is  com- 
monly  used  by private  firms,  governments  and public 
utilities.  For  example,  many  firms  have  “bulk  rate” 
pricing  schemes,  whereby  they  offer  lower  marginal 
rates  for  large  quantity  purchases.  The  income  tax 
rates  in the  U.S.  federal  income  tax schedule  depend 
on the  level  of reported  income;  higher  marginal  tax 
rates  are  levied  on  higher-income  taxpayers.  In 
addition,  the  price  per  unit  of  electricity  often 
depends  on  how  much  is  used. 
Both  market  power-a  firm’s  ability  to  affect  its 
product’s  price-and  imperfect  information  regarding 
borrowers’  characteristics  are essential  for producing 
the  loan  size-interest  rate  patterns  observed  in com- 
mercial  loan  markets.4  To  see  why,  suppose  that  a 
lender  has  market  power  and  perfect  information 
about  borrowers’  loan demand.  In this case,  we would 
observe  first-degree  (or  “perfect”)  price  discrimina- 
tion:  the  lender  would  charge  each  borrower  the  most 
he/she  is willing  to  pay  and  would  lend  to  all  that 
are  willing  to  pay  at  least  the  marginal  cost  of  the 
loan.  Suppose  instead  that  a lender  has imperfect  in- 
formation  and  operates  in  a  competitive  market. 
Milde  and  Riley  (1988,  p.  120) have  shown  that  such 
a lender  may  not  ration  credit,  even  if borrowers  can 
send  the  lender  a signal  about  their  characteristics. 
In  this  paper,  we  provide  an  explicit  analysis  of 
the  information  aspects  of  price  discrimination  in 
3 Of  course,  the  theory  we  will present  is not  inconsistent  with 
differential  credit  risk  and  loan  administration  costs,  although 
these  factors  are  not  necessary  to  obtain  the  observed  interest 
rate-loan  size  pattern. 
4 See  Jaffee  and  Modigliani  (1960)  for  an  early  distinction  be- 
tween  types  of  price  discrimination  and  credit  rationing. 
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price  discrimination  with respect  to loan size as a form 
of  credit  rationing  that  limits  borrowing  by  all but 
the  largest  borrowers.  Further,  because  we show  that 
such  credit  rationing  arises  from  ‘rational,  profit- 
maximizing  lender  behavior,  our  analysis  has 
normative  implications.  We find that  small borrowers 
are more  credit  constrained  than  large borrowers  and 
thus  bear  a larger  share  of the  distortion  induced  by 
the  market  imperfections.5  In  the  next  section,  we 
describe  a simple  prototype  economy  with  a single 
lender  and  many  different  types  of borrowers  about 
whom  the  lender  has  limited  information.  We  then 
present  the  lender’s  profit-maximization  problem. 
Section  III  follows,  describing  the  loan  size-total 
repayment  schedule  that  solves  the  lender’s  problem 
and  explaining  why  the  solution  involves  credit 
rationing  with  respect  to  loan  size.  Section  IV 
concludes. 
1I.A  SIMPLEMODELECONOMY 
Consider  an  endowment  economy  with  a  single 
lender  that  may  be  thought  of  either  as  a  local 
monopolist  or  as  a  price  leader  in  the  industry.6 
Suppose  also  that  there  are  n  types  of  borrowers, 
where  n is a positive  and  finite  number.  There  are 
Ni  borrowers  of  each  type  i (i  =  1  ,...,n)  who  live 
for only  two periods.  The  borrowers  may be thought 
of  as  privately  owned  firms  that  differ  only  with 
respect  to their  fixed endowments  of physical  good.’ 
All  firms  have  the  same  first-period  endowment: 
wi  =  0 for  all i;* however,  higher-ind.ex  firms  have 
larger  second-period  endowment:  wi+’  >  wi.  In 
addition,  each  firm’s  second-period  endowment  is 
positive  and  known  with  certainty  at the  beginning 
of  the  first  period. 
5 Price  discrimination  in loan markets  is facilitated  by banks’  use 
of “base  rate  pricing”  practices:  banks  quote  a prime  rate  (the 
base)  and  price  other  loans  off that  rate.  With  a base  rate  pric- 
ing scheme,  banks  price  loans  competitively  for large  borrowers 
with  direct  access  to credit  markets,  while  they  act as price-setters 
on  loans  to  smaller  borrowers.  Goldberg  (1982,  1984)  finds 
substantial  evidence  for  such  pricing  practices. 
6 The  changing  of the  prime  rate  has  been  interpreted  by bank- 
ing  industry  insiders  as  an  example  of  price  leadership  and 
called  “the  biggest  game  of  follow-the-leader  in  American 
business”  [Leander  (199O)l. 
’ This  interpretation  is consistent  with  Prescott  and  Boyd (1987), 
which  models  the  firm  as  a coalition  of two-period  lived  agents 
with  identical  preferences  and  endowments;  the  coalition  in our 
model  consists  of  only  one  agent. 
8 We  assume  w;  =  0 for simplicity  to guarantee  that  firms  bor- 
row  in  the  first  period. 
We  assume  that  the welfare of each  type  i firm (i.e., 
borrow,er)  is  represented  by  a  utility  function, 
u(xf,  xi),  where  xi  is the  amount  of  period  t  good 
consumed  by the  owner  of the  firm, for t  =  1,2. The 
utility  function  U(O)  indicates  the  satisfaction  that  the 
owner  gets  from  various  combinations  of consump- 
tion  in  the  two  time  periods.  We  assume  that  the 
owner’s  utility function  is twice  differentiable,  strictly 
increasing  and  strictly  concave.  These  mathematical 
properties  imply  that  the  owner  prefers  more  con- 
sumption  to  less  and  prefers  relatively  equal  levels 
of  consumption  in  the  two  time  periods.  We  also 
assume  that  xi is a normal  good,  which  means  that 
owner  i’s demand  for good  x increases  with  his/her 
income.  Given  these  assumptions  and  the  endow- 
ment  pattern  specified,  all firms  will  borrow  in the 
first  period  and  higher-index  firms  will  be  larger 
borrowers.9 
The  economy’s  single  lender  wishes  to  maximize 
profit,  which  is the  difference  between  revenues  (i.e., 
funds  received  from  loan  repayments)  and  costs 
(funds  lent).  Assume  that  the  lender’s  capital  at time 
1,  measured  in  units  of physical  good,  is  sufficient 
to  support  its  lending  policy,  and  suppose  that  the 
following information  restriction  exists:  the  lender  and 
all borrowers  know  the  utility  function,  the  endow- 
ment  pattern,  and  the  number  of borrowers  of each 
type,  but  cannot  identify  the  type  of any  individual 
borrower.  Thus,  a borrower’s  type  is private  infor- 
mation.  This  information  restriction  prevents  perfect 
price  discrimination  by the  lender  but  allows  for the 
possibility  of imperfect  discrimination  via policies  that 
result  in borrowers  correctly  sorting  themselves  in- 
to groups  by choosing  the  loan package  designed  for 
their  type.lO  Finally,  we  assume  that  borrowers  are 
unable  to  share  loans. 
The  lender’s  problem  is to  choose  a total  repay- 
ment  (i.e.,  principal  plus interest)  schedule  for period 
2,  denoted  by  P(q),  such  that  any  firm  that  borrows 
amount  q in period  1 must  repay  amount  P in period 
2.  Let  Ri(q)  denote  the  reservation  outlay  for loans 
of size q by a type  i borrower;  that  is, Ri(q)  indicates 
9 Because  endowment  patterns  are  deterministic,  there  is  no 
default  risk  in this  model  if the  lender  induces  each  type  of bor- 
rower  to self-select  the  “correct”  loan  size-interest  rate  package. 
We  will specify  self-selection  constraints  to ensure  that  all agents 
prefer  the  “correct”  package.  Consequently,  we  obtain  price 
discrimination  in  the  form  of  quantity  discounts  despite  the 
absence  of  differences  in  default  risk  across  borrowers. 
lo With  complete  information  about  borrowers’  endowments, 
the  lender  would  use  perfect  price  discrimination,  offering  each 
borrower  a loan  at the  highest  interest  rate  the  borrower  would 
willingly  pay. 
4  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  MAY/JUNE  1992 the  maximum  amount  a  type  i borrower  is willing 
to pay  at time  2 for a time  1 loan  of size  q.  Let  R’i(q) 
denote  the  derivative  of Ri(q),  which  is the  inverse 
demand  for  loans  of  size  q.  The  inverse  demand 
curve  gives,  for each  loan size q,  the  total  repayment 
amount  that  the  lender  must  request  for the  borrower 
to  choose  that  particular  loan  size.  Further  assume 
that  the  lowest-index  group  borrows  nothing 
(qa  =  0) and that  the  reservation  value  from borrow- 
ing  zero  is  zero  for  all  groups  [Ri(O)  =  01.  The 
lender’s  two-period  profit-maximization  problem  can 
now  be  stated  as  follows: 
max  (1) 
(q,,P(s,)),....(q,,P(qn)) 
6  Ni[P(qi)  - qil 
i=l 
subject  to 
for  all  i and  all j  #  i.  (2) 
Equation  (1) is the  lender’s  profit  function,  which 
is  the  aggregate  amount  repaid  at  time  2  by  all 
borrowers  (i.e.,  the  lender’s  total  revenue)  minus  the 
aggregate  amount  lent  at  time  1 (i.e.,  the  lender’s 
total  cost).  Equation  (2) summarizes  constraints  for 
all types  of borrowers  that  would  induce  a borrower 
of type  i to  willingly  select  a loan  of size  q.  These 
constraints  indicate  that  borrower  i’s gain from choos- 
ing  a loan  of size  qi  [the  left-hand  side  of (Z)] must 
be  at least  as great  as the  gain  received  from  choos- 
ing a loan  of some  other  size  qj [the  right-hand  side 
of (Z)]. If (2) is satisfied,  then  only  a type  i borrower 
would  prefer  a loan  of size  qi with  total  repayment 
P(qi).  By  choosing  loan  size  qi,  a  type  i borrower 
reveals  his/her  type  to the  lender.  Thus,  the  lender’s 
two-period  problem  is to  choose  an  amount  to lend 
at time  1, qi, and a total  repayment  schedule  for time 
2,  P(qi),  for  every  type  of  borrower. 
III.  PROPERTIES OFTHE 
OPTIMALSOLUTION 
We  can  solve  the  lender’s  profit-maximization 
problem  as follows.  (A formal  derivation  of the  solu- 
tion  appears  in the  appendix.)  When  the  lender  is 
maximizing  profit,  equation  (2)  is  satisfied  with 
equality  because  the  lender  need  only  ensure  that 
borrower  i is no  worse  off by  selecting  loan  size  qi 
instead  of any  other  loan  size  I,  j  #  i.  Using  this 
fact  and  the  assumptions  that  qo  =  0 and  Ri(0)  = 
0, and  making  successive  substitutions  into  (‘Z), one 
can  show  that 
P(qd  =  jil  [Rj(q$-Rj(~-dl.  (3) 
Equation  (3)  gives  the  lender’s  profit-maximizing 
repayment  schedule,  P(q),  for the  loan sizes qr,. . . ,qn. 
The  profit-maximizing  loan sizes now  can be deter- 
mined  as  follows.  Define 
Mi  =  6  Nj,  i  =  l,...,  n, 
j=i 
where  Mi  measures  the  total  number  of borrowers 
of types  i through  n; thus  Mn+r  =  0 because  n is the 
highest  endowment  group.  Substituting  (3) into  (l), 
differentiating  with  respect  to  qi and  using  the  defi- 
nition  of  Mi  yields 
R!,+l(qi) 
+ Ni  !  1 
for  i  =  l,...,n,  (4) 
Ni + Mi+l 
which  can  be  solved  for  the  lender’s  choice  of loan 
sizes.  Thus,  equations  (3) and  (4) together  give  the 
solution  to the  lender’s  profit-maximization  problem. 
This  solution,  which  takes  the  form  of a quantity- 
dependent  interest  rate  schedule,  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  1. 
Equation  (4)  the formula for the  optimal  loan sizes, 
has the  following properties.  It indicates  that  the  loan 
size,  qi,  offered  to  borrowers  of type  i  =  1  ,...,n  -,l 
is  strictly  less  than  the  size  available  in  a perfectly 
competitive  market  for all groups  except  the  largest. 
To  see why,  observe  that  equation  (4) indicates  that 
the  profit-maximizing  loan size for each  group  should 
be chosen  so that  the  implicit  marginal  value of a loan 
of  size  qi  to  type  i  borrowers,  R\(qi),  equals  a 
weighted  average  of the  implicit  marginal  value  of 
the  loan  to the  next  highest  group,  R\+r(qi),  and  the 
marginal  cost  of lending,  which  is one.  The  weights 
are  Mi+r/(Ni  +  Mi+r)  and  Ni/(Ni  +  Mi+r),  respec- 
tively.  In the perfectly  competitive  market,  the lender 
instead  would  equate  the  loan’s marginal  value  to its 
marginal  cost. 
Observe  that  a  profit-maximizing  lender  will 
provide  the  perfectly  competitive  loan  size  to  the 
largest  borrowers,  those  in  group  i  =  n,  because 
M n+r  =  0,  which  implies  that  RL (qJ  =  1  for 
group  n.  However,  for  all other  borrower  types  the 
weight  on  the  first  term  on  the  right-hand  side  of 
equation  (4)  is  positive.  This  indicates  that  the 
marginal  value  of a loan to the  next  highest  borrower 
(i.e.,  the  next  highest  endowment  firm)  must  be 
considered  if  the  lender  is  to  maximize  profit. 
Thus,  the  implicit  marginal  price  of a loan  to  group 
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OPTIMAL  QUANTITY-DEPENDENT  INTEREST  RATE  SCHEDULE 
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Note:  Unlike  a  typical  demand  function,  the  total  outlay  schedule  in  Figure  1  slopes  upward.  This  occurs  because  the  loan  outlay 
schedule,  P(qi)  =  prqt,  is  the  total  amount  that  a  borrower  pays  for  a  loan  of  size  qt.  In  contrast,  an  ordinary  demand  function 
represents  the  size  of  a  loan  requested  as  a  function  of  price  only  (pi).  The  total  outlay  schedule  in  Figure  1  is  “quantitydependent” 
in  the  sense  that  any  quantity  increase  implies  a  decrease  in  the  average  interest  rate  charged  by  the  lender,  CX~  =  P(qr)/qi.  Thus,  in 
Figure  1  the  average  interest  rate  charged  on  a  loan  of  size  q.  ,+,  is  lower  than  the  average  interest  rate  charged  on  a  (smaller) 
loan  of  size  qr.  Of  course  total  outlays  are  higher  for  the  larger  loan  (qr+,)  than  the  smaller  loan  (qr).  The  average  price  will  be  the 
perfectly  competitive  price  (i.e.,  a  constant,  or  uniform,  per  unit  price)  only  when  the  outlay  schedule  is  a  straight  line  through  the 
origin. 
i=l  ,...,n  -  1 borrowers  exceeds  the  marginal  cost 
of  the  loan. 
Equation  (4) and M,+ r  =  0 indicate  that  borrowers 
of type  n (those  with  the  largest  endowment)  clear- 
ly obtain  the  same  loan  size  that  they  would  receive 
in  a  perfectly  competitive  market.  However,  the 
degree  of credit  rationing  experienced  by borrowers 
from  all other  groups,  i  =  1  ,...,n  -  1,  is  regressive 
(i.e.,  inversely  related  to  their  index).  To  establish 
that  the  pattern  of distortion  is regressive,  we prove 
in the  appendix  that  our assumptions  on preferences 
and  net  worth  imply  that  Rfi+,(qi)  >  Rfi(qi), which 
means  that  higher-index  borrowers  have  a  higher 
implicit  value  for  a loan  of size  qi than  lower-index 
borrowers.  This  result  and  the  restrictions  on  the 
distribution  of borrower  types  (i.e.,  on  the  Nr) mean 
that  equation  (4) implies  that  low-index  (small)  bor- 
rowers  are  relatively  more  constrained  than  high- 
index  (large)  borrowers.  I1  This  is  confirmed  by 
the  first  term  on the  right-hand  side  of equation  (4), 
which  is  relatively  higher  for  low-index  groups.‘2 
The  final result  pertains  to  the  welfare  properties 
of the  discriminatory  price  and quantity  scheme  given 
‘I  See  Spence  (1980,  p.  824)  for  a  discussion  of  constraints  on 
the  distribution  of  consumer  types. 
‘2 For  example,  suppose  Ni  =  10 for all borrower  groups.  Fur- 
ther,  consider  an  economy  with  only  two  different  borrower 
groups,  i  =  1,2.  Let  MZ  =  0.1  and  Ms  =  0.9.  Then  clearly 
Ma/(Nt  +  Ma)  =  O.l/lO.l,  which  exceeds  Ms/(Na  +  Ms)  = 
0.9/10.9,  showing  that  the  implicit  marginal  price  of the  loan 
to  group  1 is  higher  than  the  implicit  marginal  price  to  group 
2;  the  marginal  cost  is one  in  both  cases.  This  pricing  pattern 
is  a general  feature  of  the  policy. 
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ferent  from  marginal  cost,  there  is a discriminatory 
outlay  schedule  that  benefits,  or  at  least  does  not 
harm,  all  borrowers  and  the  lender  without  side 
payments.13  In  other  words,  if the  borrowers  and 
lender  were  given  a  choice  between  (i)  any  single 
interest  rate  policy  that  differs  from  the  competitive 
interest  rate  and  (ii) a quantity-dependent  array  of 
interest  rates,  with  one  rate  appropriate  for  each 
group,  then  they  would  all prefer  or at least  be  indif- 
ferent  to  the  latter  policy  without  coercion.  This 
result  indicates  that  there  exists  some  quantity- 
dependent  interest  rate  policy  that  makes  all indi- 
viduals  at least  as well off as any uniform  interest  rate 
policy,  except  for  the  single  rate  that  prevails  in  a 
competitive  market. 
Two  other  features  of the  solution  warrant  discus- 
sion.  Because  imperfect  information  prevents  perfect 
price  discrimination,  the  lender  must  ensure  that  the 
loan  size-interest  rate  package  designed  for  each 
group  satisfies equation  (2). The  ordering  of loan sizes 
so  that  qi  2  qi-i  for  all  i,  which  is  illustrated  in 
Figure  1,  is  necessary  for  this  constraint  to  be 
satisfied.  This  condition  states  that  the  lender  must 
offer loans  to high-index  (i.e.,  large-endowment)  bor- 
rowers  that  are  at  least  as large  as  those  offered  to 
low-index  borrowers.  Further,  P(q)/q  is  weakly 
decreasing  in q, which  indicates  that  large borrowers 
pay lower average  interest  rates  than  small borrowers; 
the  declining  sequence  of ai  in  Figure  1 illustrates 
this.  These  features  of the  solution  stem  from  the 
lender’s  need  to  ensure  that  each  group  selects  the 
“correct”  loan size-interest  rate  package.  The  lender 
must  make  the  selection  of a small  loan  undesirable 
for  high-index  borrowers.  It  does  this  by  allowing 
the  average  interest  rate  to  fall with  loan  size,  thus 
letting  larger  borrowers  keep  some  of  their  gains 
from  trade.  The  lender  must  also  ensure  that  small 
borrowers  do  not  select  loans  designed  for  large 
borrowers.  Such  loan sharing  is ruled  out by assump- 
tion  here. 
We  interpret  the  preceding  results  on loan size and 
interest  rate  distortions  as  credit  rationing.  All but 
the  largest  borrowers  are  prohibited  from  obtaining 
loans  as large  as they  would  choose  if the  lender  had 
no  market  power  and  all  agents  had  perfect  infor- 
mation.  Further,  the  lower  a borrower’s  net  worth, 
the  more  troublesome  (i.e.,  distorting)  the  loan  size 
I3 See  Spence  (1980,  pp.  823-24)  for  a formal  proof. 
constraints  imposed.  These  theoretical  predictions 
appear  to  be  consistent  with  the  empirical  results 
noted  in the  introduction.  The  intuition  behind  them 
is as follows.  The  model  consists  of numerous  bor- 
rowers  who  differ along  a single  dimension,  namely, 
second-period  endowment.  The  lender  has  market 
power  and  wishes  to  maximize  profit.  It knows  the 
distribution  of borrower  types  in the  economy,  but 
does  not know  the identity  of any particular  borrower. 
This  information  restriction  prohibits  policies  such 
as perfect  price  discrimination.  However,  the  lender 
can  exploit  the  correlation  of  borrowers’  market 
choices  with  their  endowment  and  does  so by offer- 
ing  a discriminatory  interest  rate  schedule  that  ra- 
tions  loan  sizes  to  all but the  largest  group.  The  in- 
formation  implicitly  revealed  by  borrowers’  choices 
allows  the  lender  to  partially  offset  its  inability, 
because  of  imperfect  information  about  borrower 
characteristics,  to design  borrower-specific  interest- 
rate  schedules.  Thus,  the  quantity  constraints,  which 
we  interpret  as credit  rationing,  arise  endogenously 
as an optimal  response  to the  information  restriction 
in  an  imperfectly  competitive  market. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This  paper  has  presented  a theoretical  model  of 
a commercial  loan market  characterized  by imperfect 
information  and  imperfect  competition.  The  model 
shows  that  a profit-maximizing  lender  operating  in 
such  a market  will choose  to  price  discriminate  (or 
credit  ration)  by  setting  an  inverse  relationship  be- 
tween  the  loan  sizes  offered  and  the  interest  rates 
charged.  This  loan  size-interest  rate  pattern  is con- 
sistent  with  empirical  evidence  regarding  commer- 
cial lending.  In addition,  it is a good  example  of how, 
as Friedrich  von  Hayek  argued,  the  price  system  can 
economize  on information  in a way that  brings  about 
desirable  results.  Hayek  (194.5,  pp.  526-27)  noted 
that “the most  significant fact about  [the price]  system 
is the  economy  of knowledge  with  which  it operates, 
or how  little the  individual  participants  need  to know 
in  order  to  be  able  to  take  the  right  action.”  The 
analysis  here  shows  that  a lender  with  imperfect  in- 
formation  about  borrower  types  can  set  an  interest 
rate  schedule  that  reveals  borrowers’  characteristics 
through  their  borrowing  decisions.  Interestingly,  all 
loan  market  participants-the  lender  and  all  bor- 
rowers-are  at least as well off with this discriminatory 
interest  rate  schedule  as they  would  be  if faced  with 
any uniform  interest  rate  other  than  the  competitive 
rate. 
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We  adapt  an argument  in Villamil(1988)  to show 
that  our  model  is a special  case  of the  widely  used 
Spence  nonuniform  pricing  model.  Recall  that 
Ri(q)  =  pq  is the  borrowers’  reservation  outlay  func- 
tion,  where  p denotes  the  “reservation  interest  rate” 
that  a borrower  would  be  willing  to  pay  for  a loan 
of size q. We prove  that the  assumptions  of our model 
imply  reservation  outlay  functions  that  satisfy 
Spence’s  (1980,  pp.  82 1-22)  assumptions.  We  sup- 
press  the  qi and pi notation  because  it is unnecessary; 
indeed,  we  prove  our  result  for  every  nonnegative 
loan  amount  q.  In  equilibrium  each  q  is associated 
with  a  particular  p.  Thus,  the  index  i is  implicit. 
Spence’s  assumptions  are 
S. 1:  Borrower  types  can  be  ordered  so that  for  all 
9,  R,+,(q)  >  R,(q)  and R:+,(q)  >  R:(q). 
S.2:  Firms  need  not  borrow,  and  if they  do  not, 
P(0)  =  0  and  Ri(0)  =  0. 
Property  S. 1  implies  that  borrowers’  reservation 
outlay  schedules  can  be  ordered  so  that  a schedule 
representing  Ri+i(q)  as a function  of q lies  above  a 
schedule  representing  Ri(q)  and  has  a steeper  slope. 
From-S.2,  it  follows  that  the  consumer  surplus  of 
a  borrower  of  type  i  from  a  loan  of  size  q  1  0, 
Ri(q)  -  P(q),  is  at  least  as  great  as  the  reservation 
price  for  purchasing  nothing,  which  is  zero.  The 
following  proposition  shows  that  our  model  satisfies 
these  assumptions. 
Pmposit;on:  The  assumptions  on preferences  and  en- 
dowments  made  in Section  II imply reservation  outlay 
functions  for consumption  in excess  of endowment 
in  the  first  period  that  satisfy  S.l  and  S.2. 
Pm08  Let  p  denote  the  per  unit  price  of date  t + 1 
good  in  terms  of  date  t  good.  Let  q  denote  the 
amount  borrowed,  i.e.,  the  amount  of  first-period 
consumption  in  excess  of wi,  and  let  hi(p)  denote 
the  excess  demand  for first-period  consumption  by 
a  type  i borrower.  From  the  assumptions  that  u(e) 
is concave  and  that  consumption  is a normal  good, 
hi(p)  is  single-valued  and  decreasing  in  p  where 
hi(p)  >  0. Thus,  for all q  2  0,  hi(p)  has  an inverse 
that  we shall denote  by R:(q).  From  the  assumptions 
on  preferences  and  net  worth,  hi+i(p)  >  hi(p), 
and  consequently,  Ri+ i (q)  >  R:(q)  for  all q  1  0. 
Further,  letting  R,(q)  =  jgORfi(z)dz, we  have  that 
Ri+l(q)  >  Ri(q)  for  all  q  2  0.  Clearly,  S.l  is 
satisfied.  Property  S.2  is also  satisfied  because  any 
borrower  can refuse  to apply  for a loan,  in which  case 
his/her  repayment  obligation  and  reservation  outlay 
are  zero  [i.e.,  P(0)  =  Ri(0)  =  01. 
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